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Abstract
In the present paper uncertainty over the market price of
a risk-neutral competitive firm’s output and limited liabil-
ity imply the possibility of bankruptcy, give rise to moral
hazard and entail that the firm’s output decision depends
on its equity holding. Subjecting the firm to a Value-at-
Risk constraint induces it to behave in an as-if risk-averse
manner, but in a static context moral hazard persists for
a certain interval of values of equity. In a dynamic setting
the size of equity holding becomes a choice variable and the
VaR constraint guides the firm to select equity values out-
side the moral-hazard interval. Thus it achieves to reconcile
two apparently conflicting goals: encourage entrepreneurial
activity by means of limited liability and avoid irresponsible
gambling due to the incentives provided by it.
JEL classification: C61, D21, D81, G32, G33
Keywords: limited liability, moral hazard,
Value-at-Risk
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1 Introduction
It is well known that the legal provision of limited liability has the
drawback that a firm may act less carefully than it would if it were
fully liable to the outcome. To counteract this moral-hazard prob-
lem we explore in the current paper a novel approach, namely, the
use of a Value-at-Risk constraint. In a dynamic context and under
certain, as we believe, natural conditions, this will in fact disci-
pline a firm’s behavior in the sense that, even if it is risk neutral,
it does not quite behave in that way but rather similar to being
risk averse. In spite of this, limited liability can be maintained,
and so the incentives for investment are preserved.
Value-at-Risk (VaR) is a well-known concept intended to be a
measure of the risk of financial investments.1 Although it is com-
monly employed by investment banks to evaluate the market risk
of the assets they hold in their portfolio, it may also be used by
these banks to evaluate the creditworthiness of projects submit-
ted to them by firms and to determine the corresponding terms
of credit. Vice versa, a bank may impose a VaR constraint on
a firm that asks for funding to limit its exposure to risk. The
firm may then combine this with an objective - for example profit
maximization - to determine its most preferred action.
More precisely, and to illustrate this, in this paper we study
a firm a` la Greenwald-Stiglitz (1993). It produces output y fi-
nancing it partly with retained capital or equity a and partly with
debt capital b. Since the output is sold in a competitive market at
a price p which is determined only after the firm has contracted
b, there is a possibility of bankruptcy. The VaR constraint re-
quires the firm to not take an output decision which give rise to a
probability of bankruptcy larger than a predetermined threshold
probability α, the confidence level. As shown in Tulli and Weinrich
(2009) for a static context, this implies that the output decision
depends on the size of equity a and, due to the moral-hazard effect
of limited liability, this dependence is non-monotone.
1See e.g. Duffie and Pan (1997).
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In a dynamic framework a becomes endogenous: by deciding
how much of its profit realized in period t to distribute to share-
holders and how much to keep within the firm for its operations
in period t+ 1, a becomes a dynamic variable at for which an op-
timal path can be studied. It turns out that in the case that the
subjective discount rate of the firm’s shareholders is smaller than
the inverse of the interest factor the firm will always choose a path
along which the VaR constraint is binding and, moreover, that the
dynamically desired sequence (a∗t ) is constant, i.e. a∗t = a∗ ≥ 0.
That can be strenghtened to a∗ > 0 if the elasticity of scale of the
firm’s technology is not too small, i.e. sufficiently close to con-
stant returns. Finally, and most importantly, the presence of the
VaR constraint will imply that the moral-hazard effect of limited
liability does not bite. Vice versa, without a VaR constraint, in
our model not only would there be moral hazard, but a∗ would be
zero.
Value-at-Risk has achieved high status because of being writ-
ten into industry regulations (see e.g. Jorion (1997)) and is in fact
a popular instrument used in practice (e.g. Bauer (2000), Pritsker
(1997)). It also has been adopted as a standard tool to assess risk
and to calculate capital requirements in the financial industry. It
is currently the risk measure contemplated in the European sol-
vency regulation for the insurance sector (Solvency II), and this is
also the case of solvency regulation for the banking sector (Basel
accords). This is true in spite of the fact that VaR is known to
have two weaknesses: capital requirements for catastrophic losses
based on the measure may be underestimated and VaR may fail
the subadditivity property.2 Thus there are proposals to over-
come these problems, like e.g. by means of Conditional Value-at-
Risk (e.g. Lu¨thi and Doege (2005) and Rockafellar and Uryasev
(2000)), Tail Value-at-Risk and GlueVar (Belles-Sampera et al.
2A risk measure is subadditive when the aggregated risk is less than or
equal to the sum of individual risks. Subadditvity is an appealing property
when aggregating risks in order to preserve the benefits of diversification. VaR
is subadditive for elliptically distributed losses. However, in general the sub-
additivity of VaR is not granted.
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2014). Whether these extended - and necessarily more complex
- concepts will be adopted by practitioneers remains to be seen.
The model presented in this paper, by using VaR as a constraint in
profit maximization a` la Greenwald-Stiglitz (1993), is elementary
enough to not give rise to these conceptual complications.3
Regarding the use of VaR in an optimization context, various
aspects have been discussed in, for example, Kast et al. (1998),
Rockafellar and Uryasev (2002) and Yiu (2004). None, however,
have, to the best of our knowledge, tackled the issue of limited
liability and moral hazard dealt with in the present paper.
A further branch of the literature to which there can be seen
a connection of the present paper is principal-agent theory. The
bank is the principal financing, at least in part, the action of the
agent, i.e. the firm, which enjoys limited liability. To not have the
firm commit moral hazard, the bank subjects it to the VaR con-
straint. This is similar in spirit to what can be found for example
in Bias, Mariotti, Rochet and Villeneuve (2010). They analyze a
dynamic scenario in which a firm’s manager has limited liability in
preventing large but infrequent losses. It gives rise to a contract
between the firm’s financier and the manager in which downsizing
of the firm and investment decisions are made contingent on ac-
cumulated performance. This provides a rationale for prudential
regulations that request that the scale at which firms operate be
proportionate to their capital. In our paper we do not design con-
tracts, but we do obtain the result that capital holding is elicited
as a consequence of the introduction of the VaR constraint. More-
over, unless the firm’s shareholders are very shortsighted, the size
of equity holding increases with the strenghthening of the VaR
constraint, i.e. a reduction in the confidence level α, which is
comparable to a sharpening of prudential regulation.
In section 2 we present the model and analyze the static set-
3For example, the problem usually related to VaR that it provides no han-
dle on the extent of the losses that might be suffered beyond the threshold
amount will be overcome in our model by assuming - realistically, due to lim-
ited liability - a constant bankruptcy cost, i.e. independent of the size of the
firm’s chosen action.
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up. Section 3 extends it to a dynamic framework and derives the
main results. Section 4 concludes and an appendix collects some
auxiliary facts regarding the static model.
2 The Static Model
2.1 Assumptions
LetX be a real-valued random variable with continuous and strictly
increasing distribution function F (x) on the (by assumption) non-
empty set F−1 (0, 1). Then, for given confidence level α ∈ (0, 1)
we define VaRα[X] as that real number for which
F (−VaRα[X]) = α. (1)
This means that the probability that a realization of X is smaller
than or equal to −VaRα[X] is α. Equivalently, the probability
that a realization of −X (the loss) is larger than or equal to
VaRα[X] is α. If F (x) is influenced by variables (y, a), where y is
a choice variable and a a parameter, then X has distribution func-
tion F (x, y, a) and becomes a random function X(y, a). Therefore
VaRα[X(y, a)] is determined by F (−VaRα[X(y, a)], y, a) = α. If
in addition an agent desires to maximize EX(y, a) under the con-
straint that VaRα[X(y, a)] be smaller or equal to some a priorily
contemplated v ∈ R, then her decision problem becomes
maxy EX(y, a)
s.t. VaRα[X(y, a)] ≤ v.
Thus we have obtained a decision problem involving VaR as an
element to control risk.
Following Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) we now consider a firm
that produces a single output y using labour n as the only input,
with labour requirement function n = Φ(y).4 The corresponding
labour cost, wn, with w the nominal wage, is covered by the firm
4Properties of Φ will be specified in assumption (A2).
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partly with own funds or retained capital a and partly with debt
capital, b, obtained in the form of a loan from banks. Thus b =
wn−a.5 The firm sells its output on a competitive market and thus
the output price, p, is considered as not controlled by the firm but
determined by the market. Moreover, the firm does not know with
certainty the value of p when it contracts labour because there is
a time lag in production and the firm has to hire workers before
the uncertainty is resolved. Denoting with R = 1 + r the interest
factor and r the interest rate, the resulting profit, according to
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), is
π = py −R[wΦ(y)− a] =: π(y, a, p). (2)
Note that π is positive if the firm does not produce at all: in that
case the firm can act as a lender of its capital a and earn Ra.
Since p is uncertain, from the firm’s point of view it can be
considered a random variable which we denote by P and the re-
alizations of which are governed, as believed by the firm, by some
probability density g(p). Then this induces for the random vari-
able Π(y, a) := π(y, a, P ) the density
f(y, a, π) = g(Ψ(y, a, π))
∂Ψ(y, a, π)
∂π
, (3)
where
Ψ(y, a, π) :=
π +R[wΦ(y)− a]
y
(4)
is the inverse of the function π(y, a, ·). Depending on the realiza-
tion of P , profit may be negative. In that case the firm is not able
to fully repay its debt b and we consider it to be bankrupt. Being
an organization with limited liability, the firm then has to give up
its assets and bear other possible costs which add up to a constant
bankruptcy cost c ≥ 0. The expected gain for a firm producing
5Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) assume that, due to asymmetric informa-
tion, firms cannot finance their production cost by issueing new equity. See
e.g. Myers e Majluf (1984) for a formal justification of this argument.
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the output y ≥ 0 endowed with capital a ≥ 0 is therefore
Γ(y, a) :=
∫ 0
−∞
−cf(y, a, π)dπ +
∫ +∞
0
πf(y, a, π)dπ (5)
If the firm were risk neutral and had no further constraint, it would
maximize Γ(y, a). If, however, the firm has to limit the probability
of going bankrupt to α ≥ 0, then, setting
F (y, a) :=
∫ 0
−∞
f(y, a, π)dπ , (6)
its problem becomes
maxy Γ(y, a)
s.t. F (y, a) ≤ α . (7)
Recalling the definition of Value-at-Risk in (1), this is obviously
equivalent to
maxy Γ(y, a)
s.t. VaRα [Π(y, a)] ≤ 0 . (8)
Note that the firm’s degree of ”risk aversion” (not risk aversion
in the conventional sense) is expressed by the constant α ≥ 0.
Any risk can be excluded by setting α = 0. However, in that case
the firm may be severely limited in its opportunities to realize a
satisfactory profit. Therefore α > 0 may be a better choice.
Denote a solution to (8) by ŷ(a). To characterize it, we make
the following assumptions which regard the price distribution, the
technology and the cost of bankruptcy:
(A1) The price of the product is a random variable P
with density
g(p) =
⎧⎨⎩
1/ (2σ) , if 1− σ ≤ p ≤ 1 + σ
0, otherwise
where 0 < σ ≤ 1.
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(A2) Φ(y) is differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly
convex. Moreover, Φ(0) = Φ′(0) = 0 and
limy→∞Φ′(y) = +∞.
(A3) The bankruptcy cost c is zero.
Although the above specification of the price distribution is
the simplest to work with, it will not be easy to solve explicitly
for ŷ(a); still, it will enable us to show the main point.6 The
parameter σ allows us to monitor the robustness of the results
with respect to varying price dispersion.7 The normalization to
EP = 1 will simplify the calculations but not be essential in any
way to the results. Specifically, (A1) implies, recalling (2)-(4),
f(y, a, π) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1
2σy if (1− σ) y −R [wΦ(y)− a] < π
< (1 + σ) y − [RwΦ(y)− a]
0 otherwise
(9)
From this we obtain by (6)
F (y, a) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if 0 ≤ (1− σ) y −R [wΦ(y)− a]
R[wΦ(y)−a]−(1−σ)y
2σy if (1− σ) y −R [wΦ(y)− a] < 0
≤ (1 + σ)y −R [wΦ(y)− a]
1 if (1 + σ)y −R [wΦ(y)− a] < 0
(10)
Regarding (A2), note that, since labour is the only input of pro-
duction, strict convexity of Φ(y) as assumed in (A2) is equivalent
6In measure-theoretic terms, both P and Π (y, a, P ) can be thought of as
random variables defined on a probability space (Ω, F,Q) with values in (R,B),
i.e. p = P (ω) and π = Π(y, a, P (ω)), ω ∈ Ω, where B is the Borel σ-algebra on
R. According to (A1) and the definitions of f and Ψ, the distributions of P and
Π (y, a, P ) are then given by gλ = Q◦P−1 and f(y, a, ·)λ = Q◦P−1◦Ψ(y, a, ·),
respectively, where λ is the Lebesgue-Borel measure on (R,B).
7The actual standard deviation under (A1) is σ/
√
3.
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to increasing marginal cost, which, moreover, tends to infinity as
limy→∞Φ′(y) = +∞.
(A3) is technically convenient without altering the substance
of the results. The case c ≥ 0 has been dealt with in Tulli and
Weinrich (2009) under the assumption that σ = 1.
2.2 Solution of the static problem
Returning to problem (8), denote a solution to VaRα [Π(y, a)] = 0
by ŷI(a). Under (A1) it is implicitly determined, according to (7)
and (10), by
R [wΦ(ŷI(a))− a] = (2σα+ 1− σ) ŷI(a) . (11)
As we show in the Appendix (Lemma 2), ŷI(a) is a strictly in-
creasing function.
Next set ŷII(a) := argmaxy Γ(y, a). To understand its behav-
ior, we first determine Γ(y, a). To this end we define y(a) by means
of
(1− σ) y(a)−R[wΦ(y(a))− a] = 0 . (12)
It implies
y′(a) = − R
1− σ −RwΦ′ (y(a)) > 0
since
1− σ = R[wΦ(y(a))− a]
y(a)
≤ RwΦ(y(a))
y(a)
< RwΦ′(y(a))
where the last inequality holds for a > 0 by strict convexity of Φ
and Φ (0) = 0. y(a) is thus the maximum quantity the firm can
produce without any risk of bankruptcy, given a. For y ≤ y(a),
by (2) and (A1) Γ(y, a) coincides with
μ (y, a) :=
∫ +∞
−∞
πf(y, a, π)dπ = EΠ(y, a) = y −R[wΦ(y)− a] .
(13)
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Instead for (y, a) such that y ≥ y(a) consider, using (9),
μ1 (y, a) := −
∫ 0
−∞
πf(y, a, π)dπ = − 1
4σy
[
π2
]π
(1−σ)y−R[wΦ(y)−a]
(14)
where
π := min {(1 + σ)y −R [wΦ(y)− a] , 0} .
Then we obtain from (5) and (A3)
Γ(y, a) =
{
μ (y, a) , if y ≤ y(a)
μ (y, a) + μ1 (y, a) , if y ≥ y(a) (15)
By (13)
y∗ := argmax
y
μ (y, a) =
(
Φ′
)−1( 1
Rw
)
(16)
is constant and coincides with ŷII(a) for a ≥ a, where
a := wΦ (y∗)− (1− σ) y∗/R (17)
is the minimum value of a such that, when the firm maximizes
expected profit μ (y, a), there is no risk of bankruptcy. Moreover,
if σ is small enough, there is no risk of bankruptcy even if a = 0.
More precisely, set
σ :=
y∗ −RwΦ (y∗)
y∗
(18)
which is equivalent to
(1− σ) y∗ −RwΦ (y∗) = 0. (19)
Then σ is the maximum value of σ such that the expected-profit
maximizing firm faces no risk of bankruptcy whatever is the value
of a. It is obvious that σ < 1. To see that σ > 0 note that, from
(A2), Φ (y) < Φ′ (y) y for all y > 0. This implies, using (16),
y∗−RwΦ (y∗) > y∗−RwΦ′ (y∗) y∗
12
=
(
Φ′
)−1( 1
Rw
)
−RwΦ′
((
Φ′
)−1( 1
Rw
))(
Φ′
)−1( 1
Rw
)
= 0.
Since for σ ≤ σ there is no risk of bankruptcy when maximiz-
ing expected profit - and hence no problem with limited liability
and moral hazard - this case is not interesting, and therefore we
henceforth assume σ ≥ σ.
Coming back to ŷII(a), for a ≤ a it is given by
y∗∗ (a) := argmax
y
[μ (y, a) + μ1 (y, a)] . (20)
To see more precisely what μ1 (y, a) is, notice that, if (y, a) is
such that (1 + σ) y−R [wΦ(y)− a] < 0, then there is bankruptcy
for sure. It is clear that in that case, since then Γ (y, a) = 0,
μ1 (y, a) = −μ (y, a). If (1 + σ) y −R [wΦ(y)− a] ≥ 0, then π = 0
and from (14)
μ1 (y, a) =
1
4σy
{(1− σ) y −R [wΦ(y)− a]}2 . (21)
In the Appendix we show that y∗∗ (a) is a strictly decreasing func-
tion.
To complete the analysis of the decision function ŷ(a) we have
to combine ŷII (a) with the function ŷI(a). From ∂F (y, a) /∂y > 0
(see the proof of Lemma 2) it is clear that ŷ(a) is the minimum
of ŷI(a) and ŷII (a). Recalling (11) let us now temporarily write
α explicitly as an argument of ŷI , i.e. ŷI(a, α). Then observe that
by (11) and (12) ŷI(a, 0) = y (a) for all a and, by (12), (15) to
(17) and (20), ŷI(a, 0) = y (a) = y
∗ = y∗∗ (a). When α is positive,
ŷI(a, α) > y (a) for all a, as (11) yields
∂ŷI(a, α)
∂α
=
2σŷI(a, α)
RwΦ′(ŷI(a, α))− 2σα+ 1− σ
=
2σŷI(a, α)
RwΦ′(ŷI(a, α))− R[wΦ(ŷI(a,α)−a]ŷI(a,α)
=
2σŷI(a, α)
Rw
[
Φ′(ŷI(a, α))− Φ(ŷI(a,α)ŷI(a,α)
]
+ RaŷI(a,α)
> 0
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by strict convexity of Φ and Φ (0) = 0. In particular, ŷI(a, α) >
y∗∗ (a) = y∗ for α > 0.
Since by (11) ŷI(0, 0) satisfies (1− σ) ŷI(0, 0)−RwΦ (ŷI(0, 0)) =
0, from (19) for σ = σ we have ŷI(0, 0) = y
∗ and, again from (11),
ŷI(0, α) ≤ y∗ for any pair (σ, α) such that 2σα + 1 − σ ≤ 1 − σ.
For α < 1/2 this is equivalent to σ (1− 2α) ≥ σ. By continuity of
ŷI(a, α) we obtain the following result:
Lemma 1. For 0 < α < 1/2 there holds ŷI(0, α) ≤ y∗ if and
only if (σ, α) is such that σ (1− 2α) ≥ σ. In that case there exists
a ≥ 0 such that a < a and ŷI(a, α) = y∗.
Finally, since α > 0 implies ŷI(a, α) > y
∗∗ (a), and since
ŷI(a, α) = y
∗ = y∗∗ (a) and ŷI is strictly increasing and y∗∗ strictly
decreasing in a, by continuity there is â between a and a such that
ŷI(â, α) = y
∗∗ (â) . It is clear that ŷ(a) > y∗ for all a ∈ (a, a). We
summarize these findings in the following proposition.8
Proposition 1. Under assumptions (A1), (A2) and (A3), for
given confidence level α ∈ [0, 1] the firm’s problem
maxy Γ(y, a)
s.t. V aRα [Π(y, a)] ≤ 0
admits a solution ŷ (a) for any a ≥ 0. Moreover, for (σ, α) such
that 0 < α < 1/2 and σ (1− 2α) > σ there exist a, â and a with
0 ≤ a < â < a such that ŷ (a) is given by
ŷ (a) =
⎧⎨⎩
ŷI(a) if 0 ≤ a ≤ â
y∗∗ (a) if â ≤ a ≤ a
y∗ if a ≥ a
.
The solution is continuous but non-monotone in the equity base a:
strictly increasing between zero and â, strictly decreasing between
â and a, and constant beyond a. This furthermore entails that the
firm’s behavior gives rise to moral hazard whenever a ∈ (a, a).9
14
Figure 1: The function ŷ (a) (thick line)
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For an economic explanation of these results let us consider
Figure 1 and start with looking at what the firm would do in the
case of unlimited liability. Then its objective function would be
μ (y, a) as defined in (13) and consequently its optimal output y∗
given in (16) would be constant, for all a ≥ 0. To see why and
how things change when limited liability is taken into account, i.e.
the objective function is Γ(y, a) as given by (5), let us parametri-
cally diminish a from large values towards zero. For a sufficiently
large (a ≥ a) nothing changes relative to the case with unlimited
liability because for a ≥ a there is no risk of bankruptcy (region
NB).
When a is below a, more precisely in region RN (â ≤ a < a, risk
neutrality), the probability of bankruptcy while producing y = y∗
is positive and, if bankruptcy occured, the firm would suffer a loss.
With limited liability, however, the loss is contained (with zero
bankruptcy cost it is zero) and the firm has an incentive to run
a higher risk of bankruptcy, which is tantamount to producing
a quantity larger than y∗. Therefore y∗∗ (a) > y∗ for a < a.
With increasing output - i.e. decreasing a - the probability of
bankruptcy increases until at â it reaches the confidence level α.
At this point, the VaR constraint becomes binding (region VC)
and, with equity a further diminished, output ŷI(a) decreases,
too. But as long as a > a, ŷI(a) > y
∗, and the probability of
bankruptcy is larger than while producing y∗. Thus for a < a < a
there is moral hazard, whereas for a ≤ a this is no longer true.
Of course, moral hazard could be avoided by setting the con-
fidence level α to zero in which case a = â = a, but that might
severely hamper the firm’s business prospects. In particular, if the
8This is a modified version of an analogous result in Tulli and Weinrich
(2009) where we have assumed c ≥ 0 and σ = 1.
9We refer to the common definition of moral hazard according to which it is
the prospect that a party insulated from risk may behave differently from the
way it would behave if it were fully exposed to the risk. Moral hazard arises
because an individual or institution does not bear the full consequences of its
actions, and therefore has a tendency to act less carefully than it otherwise
would, leaving another party to bear responsibility for the consequences of
those actions.
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firm had zero equity, since ŷI (0) = 0 in case α = 0, the firm, from
a dynamic point of view, could not take off while with α > 0 it can.
A more satisfactory solution to the moral hazard problem will be
achieved in the dynamic framework of the next section where it
will be shown that, also when α is positive (but σ (1− 2α) ≥ σ),
the firm chooses, induced by the VaR constraint, the equity base
a so that no moral hazard occurs.
Example 1. Assume Φ(y) = ky2, k > 0. Then, setting ασ :=
σα+ 12 (1− σ) it can easily be checked that
ŷI (a) =
ασ +
√
α2σ +R
2wka
Rwk
, y∗ =
1
2Rwk
, (22)
σ = 1/2, a =
2σ − 1− 4σα
4R2wk
, a =
2σ − 1
4R2wk
. (23)
Moral hazard is a potential problem for σ > 1/2, since then a > 0
which allows for a < a. If a > a ≥ 0, too, it definitely occurs.
For example when α = 0.01 we get a ≥ 0 if σ ≥ 0.51 while for
α = 0.05 we obtain a ≥ 0 if σ ≥ 0.56.10
Furthermore it can be shown that y∗∗ (a) is that real solution
to the equation
3 (Rwk)2 y4−8Rσwky3+ (4σ + 1− σ2 − 2R2wka) y2− (Ra)2 = 0
which gives the highest value to the function Γ (·, a) ; for σ = 1 it
is 11
y∗∗ (a) =
1 +
√
1− 3R2wka
3Rwk
(24)
and then
â =
1− 2α− 3α2
4R2wk
.
10In all numerical examples values are reasonably rounded off.
11To the interested reader the derivation can be provided upon request.
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3 Dynamic Analysis
3.1 The problem
We now extend the previous analysis by embedding it in a dynamic
framework. The realized profit can be seen as the outcome of a
particular period t, π = πt, giving rise to the next period’s equity
base at+1 = (1− ηt)πt, where ηt ∈ [0, 1] is the share of profits that
is paid out to shareholders as dividends, and dt = ηtπt = πt−at+1
is their total value. This raises the question of the optimal choice
of retained capital and the accumulated value of dividends paid
over time.
Let v(a) := Γ(ŷ (a) , a) denote the value function of the static
problem. Then by Proposition 1
v(a) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Γ(ŷI(a), a) if a ≤ â
Γ(y∗∗ (a) , a) if â ≤ a ≤ a
Γ(y∗, a) if a ≥ a
(25)
We assume that the operation of the firm in any period t is guided
by the managers’ objective to maximize Γ(·, at). Then the ex-
pected dividend payment to the firm’s shareholders in that period
is v (at) − at+1, provided the firm has survived until then. The
risk-neutral shareholders maximize the discounted stream of all
these expected payments which means that, given a0, they have
to optimally choose a sequence of equity amounts (at)t≥1.
12 This
gives rise to the problem
max
(at)t≥0
∑∞
t=0 β
′
t [v (at)− at+1]
s.t. at+1 ∈ At+1 ∀t ≥ 0, a0 given,
(26)
12Starting with Jensen and Meckling (1976) a huge literature has developed
to show that managers’ objectives typically are different from those of share-
holders and, in particular, that the former may be more short-sighted; see also
footnotes 14 and 15. That shareholders are risk neutral is common in this
literature, see e.g. Biais et al. (2010).
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where β′t = Πtτ=0βτ , and βτ , τ = 0, 1, ... , are (one-period) dis-
count factors to be determined later. In particular, they will have
to capture the possibility of bankruptcy. Of course, if βτ = β for
all τ , then β′t = β
t
. Regarding the constraint sets At+1 in (26),
they will take care of the fact that, depending on the realizations
πt, not necessarily any solution to the unconstrained problem, i.e.
when At+1 = R, will be feasible. We shall solve (26) in two steps:
first when the problem is unconstrained and then when it is con-
strained. In the latter case we shall specify At+1 accordingly.
The necessary Euler-Lagrange condition for a solution a∗ =
(a∗t )t≥1 is, setting u (at, at+1) := v (at)− at+1,
u
(
a∗t−1, a
∗
t
)
+ βtu
(
a∗t , a
∗
t+1
) ≥ u (a∗t−1, at)+ βtu (at, a∗t+1) (27)
for any at ∈ At and t ≥ 1. For a solution with non binding con-
straints this means
u2
(
a∗t−1, a
∗
t
)
+ βtu1
(
a∗t , a
∗
t+1
)
= 0 ∀t ≥ 1 13 (28)
which in the present set-up yields
− 1 + βtv′ (a∗t ) = 0 ∀t ≥ 1. (29)
Note that a∗t can be determined knowing βt only, i.e. without
knowing a∗τ , τ = t. On the other hand, βt may, as we shall see
soon, be influenced by a∗τ , τ < t. However, as we shall also see, at
the solution to the unconstrained problem βt will be constant for
(almost) all t, βt = β, so that a
∗
t = a
∗. In particular a∗t will then
be independent of all the other a∗τ .
3.2 The discount factors
Let us now determine the discount factors β′t and βτ . Since in any
period τ there is a possibility of going bankrupt, say δτ ∈ [0, 1],
the probability of survival until period t ≥ 2 is Πt−1τ=1 (1− δτ ).
Thus the dividend payment in period t, v (at) − at+1, has to be
13ui denotes the partial derivative w.r.t. the i-th argument.
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multiplied by this probability to obtain its expected value. More-
over, the shareholders of the firm may have a constant subjective
one-period discount factor β ≤ 1. Then the coefficients to be ef-
fectively applied as discount factors to the outcome of any period
t, v (at)− at+1, as seen from the initial period, are
β′0 = 1, β
′
1 = β, β
′
t = β
tΠt−1τ=1 (1− δτ ) ∀t ≥ 2.
More precisely still, the probability of bankruptcy in any given
period t ≥ 1 depends on at−1 and is
δt = δ (at−1) :=
⎧⎨⎩
α if at−1 ≤ â
F (y∗∗(at−1), at−1) if â ≤ at−1 ≤ a
0 if at−1 ≥ a
Since 0 ≤ F (y∗∗(a), a) ≤ α, 1 − δ (a) ≥ 1 − α for any a ∈ [â, a].
With these specifications, the coefficients βt in (27)-(29) now be-
come
β0 = 1, β1 = β and βt = β
′
t/β
′
t−1 = β (1− δ (at−2)) ∀t ≥ 2.14
As it will turn out, the most important case will be at ≤ â for
all t and thus we shall have βt = β (1− α) for all t ≥ 2 which is
independent of at.
3.3 Determination of v′(a)
To explore condition (29), we must next determine v′(a). From
(7) and by the envelope theorem,
v′(a) =
∂Γ(ŷ(a), a)
∂a
− λ (a) ∂F (ŷ(a), a)
∂a
where λ (a) ≥ 0 is the value of the Lagrange multiplier of the VaR
constraint at the solution of the static problem. More precisely,
we have, from (25) and using (15), (13) and (21),
14Note that for β = 0 the solution to (26) reduces to Γ(ŷ(a0), a0) and at = 0
for all t ≥ 1. Thus the managers’ objective can be considered a special case
of that of the firm’s shareholders which would arise for the latter if they were
completely short-sighted.
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v′ (a)
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂μ
∂a (ŷI(a), a) +
∂μ1
∂a (ŷI(a), a)
−λ (a) ∂F∂a (ŷI(a), a)− λ (a) ∂F∂a (ŷI(a), a) if a < â
∂μ
∂a (y
∗∗(a), a) + ∂μ1∂a (y
∗∗(a), a) if â < a < a
∂μ
∂a (y
∗, a) if a > a
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
R− R22σŷI(a) [wΦ(ŷI(a))− a] +
1−σ
2σ R
+λ(a) R2σŷI(a) if a < â
R− R22σy∗∗(a) [wΦ(y∗∗(a))− a] + 1−σ2σ R if â < a < a
R if a > a
(30)
Since ŷI(â) = y
∗∗(â) and λ(â) = 0, v′− (â) = v′+ (â). Also,
y∗∗(a) = y∗ and wΦ(y∗)− a = (1− σ) y∗/R imply
v′− (a) = R− R
2
2σy∗
(1− σ) y∗/R+ 1− σ
2σ
R = R = v′+ (a) .
Thus v (a) is differentiable. Moreover, since wΦ(y∗∗(a)) − a >
(1− σ) y∗/R for a < a, v′ (a1) < R = v′ (a2) for all a1 ∈ [â, a),
a2 ≥ a.
Consider now what happens to λ (a) as a → 0. Since the VaR-
constraint is binding for a < â, λ (a) > 0 in that case. Moreover,
from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions,
∂Γ(ŷI(a), a)
∂y
− λ (a) ∂F (ŷI(a), a)
∂y
= 0
and thus
λ (a) =
∂Γ(ŷI(a),a)
∂y
∂F (ŷI(a),a)
∂y
.
From (13) and (21) we get
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∂Γ(y,a)
∂y
= 1−RwΦ′ (y)
+
(
1
4σy
)2
(8σy {(1− σ) y −R [wΦ(y)− a]}{
1− σ −RwΦ′(y)}− 4σ {(1− σ) y −R [wΦ(y)− a]}2)
= 1−RwΦ′ (y)
+
1
2σy
{(1− σ) y −R [wΦ(y)− a]}{1− σ −RwΦ′(y)}
− 1
4σy2
{(1− σ) y −R [wΦ(y)− a]}2 .
If y = ŷI(a), then by (11)
∂Γ(y, a)
∂y
= 1−RwΦ′ (y) + 1
2σy
{−2σαy}{1− σ −RwΦ′(y)}
− 1
4σy2
{−2σαy}2
= 1− (1− α)RwΦ′ (y)− σα2 − (1− σ)α .
On the other hand, from (10) for y = ŷI(a)
∂F
∂y (y, a)
=
2σy [RwΦ′(y)− (1− σ)]− 2σ {R [wΦ(y)− a]− (1− σ) y}
(2σy)2
=
y [RwΦ′(y)− (1− σ)]− 2σαy
2σy2
=
RwΦ′(y)− 2σα− (1− σ)
2σy
.
Therefore
λ (a) =
1− (1− α)RwΦ′ (y)− σα2 − (1− σ)α
RwΦ′(y)− 2σα− (1− σ) 2σy .
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Inserting in (30) and using (11) yields
v′ (a)
= R− R
2
2σŷI(a)
[wΦ(ŷI(a))− a] + 1− σ
2σ
R
+
1− (1− α)RwΦ′ (ŷI(a))− σα2 − (1− σ)α
RwΦ′(ŷI(a))− 2σα− (1− σ) R
= R
[
1− α+ 1− (1− α)RwΦ
′ (ŷI(a))− σα2 − (1− σ)α
RwΦ′(ŷI(a))− 2σα− (1− σ)
]
= R
(1− α) (−2σα− (1− σ)) + 1− σα2 − (1− σ)α
RwΦ′(ŷI(a))− 2σα− (1− σ)
= R
−2σα− (1− σ) + 2σα2 + (1− σ)α+ 1− σα2 − (1− σ)α
RwΦ′(ŷI(a))− 2σα− (1− σ)
= R
−2σα+ σ + σα2
RwΦ′(ŷI(a))− 2σα− (1− σ)
=
σ (1− α)2R
RwΦ′(ŷI(a))− 2σα− (1− σ) .
Using that (11) implies
ŷ′I(a) =
R
RwΦ′(ŷI(a))− 2σα− (1− σ) (31)
we get
v′ (a) = σ (1− α)2 ŷ′I(a) . (32)
By (11) and (31) we can rewrite ŷ′I(a) as
ŷ′I(a) =
1
wΦ′(ŷI(a))− wΦ(ŷI(a))−aŷI(a)
.
In particular,
ŷ′I(0) =
1
wΦ′(ŷI(0))− wΦ(ŷI(0))ŷI(0)
. (33)
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Moreover, (11) yields
Rw
Φ(ŷI(0))
ŷI(0)
= 2σα+ 1− σ . (34)
3.4 Solution of the unconstrained dynamic problem
Let us now go back to the dynamic unconstrained optimality con-
dition (29). We distinguish between:
• at < â, the V C region (VaR constrained),
• â < at < a, the RN region (risk neutrality), and
• at > a, the NB region (no bankruptcy).
Consider first the case that at ∈ NB. Then δ (at) = 0, βt =
β and hence, if there were an optimal policy (at), it should be
constant. Since from (30) v′ (at) = R, (29) becomes
−1 + βR = 0 .
Unless in the unlikely case that β = 1/R, this condition can ob-
viously not be fulfilled. If βR > 1, then at should be increased
without limit. If, on the contrary, βR < 1, then
u2 (at−1, at) + βu1 (at, at+1) = −1 + βR < 0
for all t, and hence it is always convenient to decrease at.
15 This
leads the firm to exit the NB region. Thus we have the following
result:
15It is common in the principal-agent literature to assume that the principal
is less impatient than the agent (see e.g. Biais et al.(2010)). Since a loan at
interest rate r transforms each unit of money into R = 1+r units after one year,
1/R can be thought of as the bank’s shareholders’ discount factor. Thinking
of them and the firm’s shareholders as principal and agent, respectively, this
means that 1/R > β.
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Proposition 2. In case the firm’s shareholders’ discount factor β
is smaller than 1/R, it is not dynamically optimal to stay in the
region where there is no risk of bankruptcy.
Next consider the case that at ∈ RN . Then, since R[wΦ(y∗∗(a))−
a] > (1− σ) y∗∗(a) for a < a, (30) implies
− R
2
2σy∗∗(a)
[wΦ(y∗∗(a))− a] + 1− σ
2σ
R < 0 for a < a . (35)
Therefore we have v′ (at) < R. Moreover, βt = β (1− δ (at−2)) <
β, and hence −1+βtv′ (at) < 0 if βR < 1. Thus also in this region
no optimal at exists; it would be reduced until the region RN were
left to enter region V C.
Finally consider region V C. Here v′ (a) varies between v′ (â)
and v′ (0). Since λ(â) = 0,
v′ (â) = R− R
2
2ŷI(â)
[wΦ(ŷI(â))− â] + 1− σ
2σ
R < R
by (35) as ŷI(â) = y
∗∗(â) and â < a. Moreover, βt = β (1− α) <
β. Thus −1 + βtv′ (â) < 0 if β (1− α)R < 1 and it is convenient
to diminish at below â. This implies that a sufficient condition
for the existence of a stationary positive stationary a∗ ∈ V C, i.e.
such that −1 + β (1− α) v′ (a∗) = 0, is that
− 1 + β (1− α) v′ (0) > 0 (36)
⇔ (by (32))
−1 + βσ (1− α)3 ŷ′I(0) > 0
⇔ (by (33))
−1 + βσ (1− α)
3 ŷI(0)
wΦ′(ŷI(0))ŷI(0)− wΦ(ŷI(0)) > 0
⇔
βσ (1− α)3 > w
[
Φ′(ŷI(0))− Φ(ŷI(0))
ŷI(0)
]
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⇔
Φ′(ŷI(0))− Φ(ŷI(0))
ŷI(0)
<
βσ (1− α)3
w
⇔
Φ′(ŷI(0))
ŷI(0)
Φ(ŷI(0))
− 1 < βσ (1− α)
3
w
ŷI(0)
Φ(ŷI(0))
. (37)
Note that we can express this inequality in terms of the elasticity
of scale which, denoting the production function y = f (n) :=
Φ−1 (n), is
f ′ (n)
n
f (n)
=
1
Φ′(y)
Φ(y)
y
=: εs (y) .
Thus (37) is equivalent to
1
εs (ŷI(0))
< 1 +
βσ (1− α)3
w
ŷI(0)
Φ(ŷI(0))
which, using (34), yields
εs (ŷI(0)) >
[
1 +
βσ (1− α)3
2σα+ 1− σR
]−1
. (38)
Since Φ is strictly convex with Φ (0) = 0, Φ′(y) > Φ(y)/y for all
y, which implies εs (y) < 1 for all y.
Example 2. For Φ(y) = ky2 one obtains εs (y) = 1/2 for all y.
Using α = 0.01, β = 0.9 and R = 1.1, we get for the right hand
side of (38)
(1− 0.98σ) / (1− 0.019σ) =: φ (σ)
which is smaller than 1/2 whenever σ > 0.515. For example,
φ (0.6) = 0.42 and φ (1) = 0.02. The larger is price riskiness,
reflected by a larger σ, the stronger is the need to hold sufficient
equity and the easier it is that the sufficient condition for a∗ > 0
be satisfied.
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Note that condition (38) can be verified without knowing the
value of ŷI(0) if sufficient information is available about the elas-
ticity function εs (·), for instance that it is constant. This is for
example true if the labour requirement function is of the form
Φ(y) = kyγ in which case εs = 1/γ. Note also that (38) can never
be fulfilled if β = 0, that is if shareholders do not care at all about
any period other than the present one. In fact, it is clear that in
this case a∗ = 0 since the shareholders choose ηt = 1 in any period
t (as long as the firm exists). We summarize the results in the
following proposition and illustrate it in Figure 2.
Figure 2: The function v (a) and the graphical characterization of
a∗.
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Proposition 3. Assume a discount factor β for the firm’s share-
holders such that βR < 1 and At = R for all t. Then the opti-
mal amount of equity is a constant value a∗ ≥ 0 lying in region
VC (i.e. the VaR constraint is binding) and satisfying v′ (a∗) ≤
[β (1− α)]−1, with
v′ (a∗) =
1
β (1− α) if a
∗ > 0 . (39)
A sufficient condition for a∗ to be positive is that the firm’s elastic-
ity of scale, εs (y) = (1/Φ
′(y)) (Φ(y)/y), is not too small at ŷI(0),
i.e.
εs (ŷI(0)) >
[
1 +
βσ (1− α)3
2σα+ 1− σR
]−1
. (40)
Otherwise a∗ may be zero, for example if β is close to zero. That
would also be the outcome if the firm were not subjected to the VaR
constraint.
3.5 Solution of the complete dynamic problem
Related to the unconstrained solution a∗ is the optimal quantity
of output y∗ = ŷI(a∗). Since πt = pty∗ − R [wΦ (y∗)− a∗] and
pt is random and hence varying, it may occur that a
∗ > πt for
some t. Then a∗ is obviously not feasible and, since then v′ (a) >
v′ (πt) > v′ (a∗) for all a < πt, the best choice is a∗t+1 = πt. The
firm remains in region VC, retains all its period-t profit as new
equity and does not pay any dividend. If in period t+1 it realizes
a profit πt+1 ≥ a∗, it will choose a∗t+2 = a∗ and pay the dividend
πt+1 − a∗. Otherwise it will set a∗t+2 = πt+1, pay zero dividend,
and so on, until for the first time πt < 0 when it ceases activity.
This, from the shareholders’ point of view, is the best dividend
policy. We can summarize it in the following way:
Corollary 1. Under the same assumptions as in Proposition 3,
except that now At+1 = [0,max {πt, 0}] for all t where πt is the
realized profit in period t, shareholders’ best dividend policy is dt =
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max {πt − a∗, 0} for all t. If πt < 0, which in each period occurs
with probability α, the firm is bankrupt and ceases activity. In that
case dτ = 0 for all τ ≥ t.
Note that the lifespan of a firm is not influenced by the numeri-
cal values of the realizations of πt as long as they are not negative.
This is due to the fact that under the VaR-constraint the out-
put quantity ŷI(at) is always chosen such that the probability of
bankruptcy is equal to the confidence level α, independently of
what at is.
Example 3. As in the previous examples assume Φ(y) = ky2,
k > 0. Then (22) implies
ŷ′I(a) =
R
2
(
α2σ +R
2wka
)−1/2
and (32)
v′ (a) = σ (1− α)2 R
2
(
α2σ +R
2wka
)−1/2
.
Thus
v′ (a) =
1
β (1− α)
⇔ βσ (1− α)3R = 2 (α2σ +R2wka)1/2
⇔ 4R2wka = β2σ2 (1− α)6R2 − 4α2σ
⇔
a∗ =
(1− α)6R2β2σ2 − 4α2σ
4R2wk
. (41)
With α = 0.01, β = 0.9, R = 1.1, w = 1 and k = 0.01 this
yields a∗ as an increasing function of σ, with a∗ > 0 whenever
σ > 0.515. In particular, for σ = 1 the following numerical values
result: a∗ = 19.06 and, from (22), y∗ = ŷI(a∗) = 44.58 < 45.46 =
y∗.Then πt = pty∗ − R [wΦ (y∗)− a∗] ≥ a∗ if and only if pt ≥
0.45. By (A1) the probability that this occurs is approximately 78%.
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Alternatively, to have at least a 50% probability that ptŷI(at) −
R [wΦ (ŷI(at))− at] ≥ a∗, it is sufficient that at ≥ 3.43 which is
18% of a∗. Finally, a 50% probability of survival until period t is
taken on when t = 69.
3.6 Comparative statics
From the above discussion it is clear that a∗t ≤ a∗ for all t where
the case a∗t < a∗ is forced upon shareholders only if the realization
πt−1 was too small. We therefore henceforth call a∗ the dynami-
cally desired level to distingiush it from the dynamically optimal
sequence (a∗t )t≥1. The comparative statics effect of a change in the
confidence level α is captured by how a∗ and the corresponding
output level y∗ := ŷI(a∗, α) react to it, where ŷI(a, α) is implicitly
defined by (11). We thus proceed now in this sense.
By (32) and (39) we have
∂ŷI
∂a
(a∗, α) =
1
βσ (1− α)3 if a
∗ > 0 . (42)
Since from (11)
∂ŷI
∂a
(a, α) =
1
wΦ′ (ŷI(a, α))− (2σα+ 1− σ) /R
(42) implies for y∗
wΦ′ (y∗)− 2σα+ 1− σ
R
= βσ (1− α)3 . (43)
This yields the following comparative statics results.
Proposition 4. The dynamically desired values of output y∗ and
equity base a∗ react to a change in the confidence level α as follows:
∂y∗
∂α
{
< 0 for β > β (α)
> 0 for β < β (α)
(44)
where
β (α) :=
2
3R (1− α)2
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and β (α) < 1 for α < 1 −√2/3 ≈ 0.184. A sufficient condition
for
∂a∗
∂α
< 0
is β > β (α).
Proof. Differentiating (43) implicitly yields
∂y∗
∂α
= −−2σ/R+ 3β (1− α)
2
wΦ′′ (y∗)
= σ
2/R− 3β (1− α)2
wΦ′′ (y∗)
which is negative iff
β >
2
3R (1− α)2 = β (α) .
Since R > 1, α < 1−√2/3 implies β (α) < 1.
From (11) we obtain
∂a∗
∂α
=
[
wΦ′ (y∗)− 2σα+ 1− σ
R
]
∂y∗
∂α
− 2σ
R
y∗
= σ
{[
β (1− α)3
] ∂y∗
∂α
− 2
R
y∗
}
(45)
by (43). (44) implies the claim.
An increase in the confidence level has different effects on output
depending on how farsighted the firm’s shareholders are. A larger
α decreases the right hand side in the optimality condition (43)
and, thus, the left hand side must be decreased as well. Since Φ is
convex, Φ′ is increasing in y, and therefore decreasing y∗ favours
to rebalance the equation. But an increase in α decreases the left
hand side anyway, and so it is not always necessary to reduce y∗.
That depends on the size of the change on the right hand side
which depends on β. If β is large, so is the decrease of the right
hand side and thus the left hand side decrease must be large, too,
which then may require a decrease of y∗. Therefore farsighted
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shareholders (β > β (α), e.g. with R = 1.1, β (0.01) = 0.62)
prefer to decrease output while shortsighted ones would opt for
the opposite.
A similar argument holds for a∗. A more severe VaR constraint
(smaller α) induces the firm to hold a larger capital buffer as a
prudential measure in case shareholders have a more farsighted
attitude. When they are very shortsighted, however, a reduction
in a∗ cannot be excluded, this depending by (45) on the sign and
the size of the change in output.
3.7 Moral hazard
A result of the static model was that for values of the equity base a
in the interval (a, a) there arises moral hazard since for those values
the output ŷ (a), taking the firm advantage of limited liability, is
larger than y∗, the output under unlimited liability. This implies
a larger probability of bankruptcy than without limited liability.
Since in the dynamic context it is the firm which chooses its equity,
i.e. a∗, for no moral hazard to occur it is therefore sufficient to
show that y∗ = ŷ (a∗) ≤ y∗. This is made precise in the following
theorem and illustrated in Figure 3.
Theorem 1. Assume βR < 1 and α ≤ (3−√5) /2 ≈ 0.382.
Then, whenever the dynamically desired value of capital a∗ is pos-
itive there is no moral hazard. If a∗ = 0, no moral hazard occurs
whenever σ (1− 2α) ≥ σ.
Proof. If a∗ > 0, (43) yields
Φ′ (y∗) =
2σα+ 1− σ
Rw
+
βσ (1− α)3
w
.
By (16) it follows that y∗ ≤ y∗ iff
(
Φ′
)−1(2σα+ 1− σ
Rw
+
βσ (1− α)3
w
)
≤ (Φ′)−1( 1
Rw
)
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which, by strict convexity of Φ, is equivalent to
2σα+ 1− σ
Rw
+
βσ (1− α)3
w
≤ 1
Rw
⇔ 2α− 1 + β (1− α)3R ≤ 0
⇔ βR ≤ 1− 2α
(1− α)3 .
It is elementary to show that the term on the right-hand side is
larger than or equal to one for α ∈ [0, 1] if and only if 0 ≤ α ≤(
3−√5) /2.
Next consider the case a∗ = 0. From Lemma 1 we know that
for 0 < α < 1/2 ŷI(0) ≤ y∗ if and only if (σ, α) is such that
σ (1− 2α) ≥ σ. Since then y∗ = ŷI(0), and as
(
3−√5) /2 < 1/2,
this proves the claim.
Recall that the solution of the complete dynamic problem as dis-
cussed in Section 3.5 takes account of the possibility that at =
πt−1 < a∗ for some t. Since the region of no moral hazard reaches
from zero to a ≥ a∗ it is clear that the above theorem extends to
all these possible cases.
Note that condition (40) for a∗ > 0 can always be satisfied,
for a given firm’s elasticity of scale εs, by assuming price riskiness
sufficiently large - i.e. σ sufficiently close to one - and the VaR
constraint sufficiently tight - i.e. α sufficiently close to zero, thus
avoiding moral hazard. But even if a∗ = 0, the same is true with
regard to satisfying the condition σ (1− 2α) ≥ σ. Moreover, this
condition implies that, whenever in the case a∗ = 0 moral hazard
might become a problem, for given price riskiness σ > σ there
always exists α > 0 small enough so as to exclude it.
Note also that, although moral hazard has been overcome, lim-
ited liability has been preserved: the cost of bankruptcy is still
zero. What the VaR constraint does is not to eliminate limited
liability; rather, it limits the firm’s choice such that the probabil-
ity of bankruptcy is not larger than α. Moreover, that probability
at the chosen point (a∗, y∗) is smaller than it would be under un-
limited liability and without the VaR constraint , i.e. at (a∗, y∗).
Hence there is no moral hazard.
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Figure 3: The dynamically optimal choice of the firm and its
shareholders.
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Example 4. Under the same assumptions as in the previous ex-
amples, i.e. in particular α = 0.01, it can be calculated that
σ (1− 2α) < σ < σ and hence a∗ = 0 with y∗ > y∗ if 0.5 < σ <
0.51; σ (1− 2α) ≥ σ and a∗ = 0 with y∗ ≤ y∗ if 0.51 ≤ σ ≤ 0.515;
and a∗ > 0 (with y∗ < y∗) if 0.515 < σ ≤ 1. In the latter case,
price uncertainty is large (and α small) enough to induce the firm
to hold a positive amount of equity to meet its VaR constraint.
When σ < 0.515, the firm would like to reduce equity holding, but
it cannot do this as the non-negativity constraint on a∗ is bind-
ing. Thus the firm produces the maximum quantity it is permitted
under the VaR constraint with zero equity holding. As long as
σ (1− 2α) ≥ σ, the corresponding quantity remains below y∗. But
when σ (1− 2α) < σ, price riskiness is so small and/or the con-
fidence level so large that, even with a binding VaR constraint,
the firm is allowed to produce a quantity larger than y∗. Thus
there is moral hazard for 0.5 < σ < 0.51 and no moral hazard for
0.51 ≤ σ ≤ 1. (For σ ≤ 0.5 there is no risk of bankruptcy and
no moral hazard since the expected profit maximizing firm chooses
y∗.)
In particular, for σ = 1 we get a∗ = 19.06 < a = 19.84 <
â = 20.24 < a = 20.66 and y∗ = 44.58 < y∗ = 45.46 < ŷI(â) =
45.91. Moreover, using (2) and (A1) to calculate the probability of
bankruptcy
prob (Π(y, a) < 0) = prob
(
p <
R [wΦ (y)− a]
y
)
=
1
2
R [wΦ (y)− a]
y
=
1.1
(
0.01y2 − a)
2y
,
at (a∗, y∗) it is 0.019 > 0.01 = α, the latter being the probability
of bankruptcy at (a∗, y∗). Without the VaR constraint but with
limited liability, i.e. at (a∗, y∗∗ (a∗)) = (19.06, 47.12) (from (24)),
the corresponding number is 0.037. Thus with limited liability,
the introduction of the VaR constraint reduces the probability of
bankruptcy by (0.037− 0.01) /0.037 = 72.8%,requiring a reduction
of (0.471− 0.446) /0.471 = 5.4%of output only! These values con-
35
firm Theorem 1 and underline quite strikingly the effectiveness of
the VaR constraint.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have investigated the behaviour of a firm which is
subject to a Value-at-Risk constraint. The rationale for doing this
is to discipline the firm in its choices under uncertainty - bearing
the risk of bankruptcy - and limited liability. The latter is at the
heart of the functioning of the capitalist system. Tightening or
even abolishing it would clearly have a negative effect on economic
activity.16 These circumstances create a moral-hazard problem as
the firm can shift a part of the cost of risk-taking to its creditors
and may distort its incentives towards behaving in a gambling way.
A VaR constraint limits this distortion in that it induces the firm
to abandon a risk-neutral attitude in case the risk of bankruptcy
is about to exceed a certain predefined probability, namely, the
confidence level. Thus the firm comes to behave as if it were kind
of risk averse, albeit not risk averse in the conventional sense.
In a static set-up, when the capital endowment or equity base
of the firm is given, the type of the firm’s behavior - either ”VaR
constraint risk averse” or risk neutral - varies according to the size
of the equity base. The different regimes create a non-monotonicity
in the firm’s output decision with respect to the capital endow-
ment.
In a dynamic framework capital can be chosen in each period
by selecting the corresponding dividend payment to sharehold-
ers. The model implies that the desired amount of capital to be
retained in each period is constant over time and lies in a sub-
set of the regime where the VaR constraint is binding and where
the moral-hazard problem does not arise, even though limited li-
ability is preserved. Thus Value-at-Risk achieves to reconcile two
apparently conflicting goals, namely, to encourage entrepreneurial
16See e.g. Berkowitz and White (2004) and Fan and White (2003).
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activity by means of limited liability and to avoid irresponsible
gambling due to the incentives provided by it.
The comparative statics analysis of the dynamically desired
values of retained capital and output with respect to the confi-
dence level α reveals that the reaction of the desired output level
is reversed in the case shareholders are farsighted as opposed to
the one in which they are shortsighted. Moreover, a reduction of
α - a strengthening of the VaR constraint - induces firms, with
shareholders sufficiently farsighted, to increase their capital hold-
ing. This result underlines the potential of the VaR constraint as a
possible policy instrument of prudential regulation of risk-taking,
which should be welcome also in light of the recent financial and
economic crisis where apparently one of its reasons was that banks
were too lenient providing loans. In future research we intend to
take up this issue and look more closely at practical applications
of our theoretical model.
Appendix
Lemma 2. ŷI(a) is a strictly increasing function.
Proof. From F (ŷI(a), a) = α for all a differentiating implicitly
yields ŷ′I(a) = −∂F∂a (y, a)/∂F∂y (y, a) where y = ŷI(a). Using (10),
∂F
∂a (y, a) = −R/ (2σy) < 0 whereas
∂F
∂y
(y, a) =
1
(2σy)2
{
2σy
[
RwΦ′ (y)− (1− σ)]
− {R[wΦ(y)− a]− (1− σ) y} 2σ}
=
1
2σy2
{
y
[
RwΦ′ (y)
]− {R[wΦ(y)− a]}}
=
1
2σy
{
Rw
[
Φ′ (y)− Φ (y)
y
]
+
Ra
y
}
> 0
since by (A2) Φ′ (y)− Φ (y) /y > 0 for any y > 0.
To show that y∗∗ (a) is a strictly decreasing function we shall apply
the following
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Lemma 3. Let h (x, a) be a twice differentiable function such that
x∗ (a) := argmaxx h (x, a) exists for all a and
∂2h (x, a)
∂x∂a
< 0 (46)
for all x and a. Then x∗ (a) is strictly decreasing.
Proof. Let a1 > a0 and assume to the contrary that there ex-
ists x ≥ x∗ (a0) such that h (x, a1) ≥ h (x, a1) for all x. Then
h (x, a1) ≥ h (x∗ (a0) , a1) and∫ x
x∗(a0)
∂h
∂t
(t, a1) dt = h (x, a1)− h (x∗ (a0) , a1) ≥ 0.
Thus by (46)∫ x
x∗(a0)
∂h
∂t
(t, a0) dt >
∫ x
x∗(a0)
∂h
∂t
(t, a1) dt ≥ 0
and therefore
h (x, a0) =
∫ x
x∗(a0)
∂h
∂t
(t, a0) dt+ h (x
∗ (a0) , a0) > h (x∗ (a0) , a0)
which is a contradiction.
Lemma 4. y∗∗ (a) is a strictly decreasing function.
Proof. We seek to sign ∂2Γ (y, a) /∂y∂a where Γ (y, a) = μ(y, a) +
μ1(y, a). By (13) ∂
2μ (y, a) /∂y∂a = 0 whereas, by (14),
∂μ1(y,a)
∂y
= − 1
4σy2
{(1− σ) y −R [wΦ(y)− a]}2
+
1
2σy
{(1− σ) y −R [wΦ(y)− a]}{1− σ −RwΦ′(y)}
=
1
2σy
{(1− σ) y −R [wΦ(y)− a]}
×
{
1− σ −RwΦ′(y)− 1
2y
{(1− σ) y −R [wΦ(y)− a]}
}
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and hence
∂2μ1 (y, a)
∂y∂a
=
1
2σy
{
R
{
1− σ −RwΦ′(y)}
− 1
2y
{(1− σ) y −R [wΦ(y)− a]}
}
− 1
2σy
{
(1− σ) y −R [wΦ(y)− a] R
2y
}
=
R
2σy
{
1− σ −RwΦ′(y)
−1
y
{(1− σ) y −R [wΦ(y)− a]}
}
=
R
2σy
{
−RwΦ′(y) + RwΦ(y)
y
− Ra
y
}
< 0
by strict convexity of Φ and Φ (0) = 0. This implies
∂2Γ (y, a) /∂y∂a < 0. Hence we can apply the previous Lemma to
conclude that y∗∗ (a) is decreasing for a < a.
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